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KENNETH E. BOULDING
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IN VIEW of the importance of philanthropy in our society, it is sur-
prising that so little attention has been given to it by economic or
social theorists. In economic theory, especially, the subject is almost
completely ignored. This is not, I think, because economists regard
mankind as basically selfish or even because economic man is supposed
to act only in his self-interest; it is rather because economics has essen-
tially grown up around the phenomenon of exchange and its' theoreti-
cal structure rests heavily on this process. Exchange is a reciprocal
transfer. Philanthropy, apparently, represents a unilateral transfer.
In an exchange, something is transferred from party A to party B and
something else from B to A. The ratio of these two quantities is, of
course, the ratio of exchange and if one of the exchangeables is money,
then this ratio is a price. The price system is a basic one for the econo-
mist and he tends to regard society as being organized by it. This is
true even in national income economics for money income always
represents quantity of commodity multiplied by its price. In a single
transfer or gift, however, there is no price, for nothing is given in
exchange. The economist, hence, feels rather at sea. When he finds
himself in an area of social life which is apparently priceless, he
hardly knows what to do.
It is tempting for the economist to argue that there are really no
gifts and that all transactions involve some kind of exchange, that is,
some kind of quid pro quo. If we drop a dime in the blind man's
cup, it is because the blind man gives us something. We feel a cer-
tain glow of emotional virtue, and it is this that we receive for our
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dime. Looked at from the point of view of the recipient, we might
suppose that the blind man gives out a commodity or service which
consists in being pitiable. Even if we look upon the transaction as an
exchange, however, it is clearly a very curious one. The dime in the
cup is a clear enough transfer of assets from the donor to the recipient.
What passes from the recipient to the donor, however, is mysterious.
There is no conservation of assets here. The glow of self-righteousness
which is felt by the donor may have no corresponding emotion, feel-
ing, or disutility in the mind of the blind man. That which is in some
sense cost to the blind man, that is, what he gives up, is not the same
thing as the receipt to the donor. This phenomenon, of course, is not
peculiar to the situation of the pure gift. It is true of almost any trans-
action or exchange involving services. Thus, we are familiar with the
fact that in the wage bargain, what the worker gives up is not what the
employer receives. Even though what the employer gives up is phys-
ically what the worker receives (money), the significance of the cost to
the employer may be very different from that of the receipt to the
worker. We have here a transaction which is much more complicated
than the simple exchange of wheat for money on the wheat market,
in which what is given up by the seller is of the same order as what
is received by the buyer. It begins to look, therefore, as if some of the
peculiarities of philanthropy penetrate rather deeply into the economic
system.
We should notice, also, that the basic concept of the gift, that is,
the unilateral or one-way transfer, extends far beyond what is usually
thought of as philanthropy. It applies to anything which may be
classified as a transfer payment, whether this is made by the private
donor, a foundation, or by government. Transfer payments, especially
the payments by government, are coming to be an increasing element
in our economic life. They presumably have much the same kind of
impact on the economy that philanthropic gifts have, although their
legal position and their mode of organization may be very different.
It might be argued, therefore, that all unilateral transfers whether
these are the transfer payments of government, for instance, in agri-
cultural subsidies or social security payments, or whether they are
the grants of foundations, or even simple gifts among individuals,
should be regarded as elements in what Talcott Parsons calls the
"polity" rather than the economy. A very interesting question, some-
what peripheral to the main issue, is whether interest payments or
even bank loans should be regarded as part of the system of unilateral
transfers; that is, again, as elements in the polity. There is here, it
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is true, a form of exchange over time—an exchange of money now
for money later. In the immediate present, however, this looks very
much like the unilateral transfer and the curious attitude of the
United States government towards interest payments, which it allows
as a deduction from income in much the same way as charitable con-
tributions, is an indication and recognition of the peculiar status of
this form of transfer. Wha.t we have here is clearly a continuum with
ordinary acts of exchange at one end and charitable gifts at the other,
but with a great many intermediate forms and stages.
Just as a loan may be regarded as a short-run gift but as a long-run
exchange, so may outright gifts be in this category. In some societies,
indeed, almost all gifts are essentially what the anthropologists call
"silent trade"; that is, almost always made in the expectation of a
return gift. It has been argued by some anthropologists that gifts essen-
tially antedate exchange as a social institution, and that exchange
arises out of a mutual transfer of gifts. In our society the exchange of
gifts at Christmas is perhaps a case in point. Even though it is sup-
posed to be more blessed to give than to receive, most of us probably
find that if our gifts strikingly exceed our receipts, or the reverse, we
feel a little uncomfortable.
A very interesting but very complex example of long-run exchange
is that among the generations. In any short period of time, it is clear
that the people in middle life, who for the most part produce the
real income of society, have to share this real income both with the
young and with the old. The middle-aged must support the unpro-
ductive, whether the lack of productivity is the result of immaturity or
of senescence. The problem of how much such support the middle-
aged should give is always a rather critical matter of social policy,
about which there may be a good deal of disagreement. This question,
too, is related to the problem of interest. The property of society is
mostly held by the old. If rates of interest and, indeed, rates of profit
are high, the middle-aged have to contribute large amounts of the
current products of society to the support of the old. If rates of interest
and of profit are low, it is probable that there will be a redistribution
of income away from the old, perhaps even away from the young,
towards the middle-aged.
There is clearly here, something that looks like an exchange across
the generations. The young are supported by the middle-aged in the
hope that when the middle-aged are old, the young, who will then be
middle-aged, will then support them. Thus, when we are young,
we receive more than we contribute to society, in middle-age we pay
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off this debt, and indeed more than pay it off, by supporting both
the then young and the then old. In middle-age, therefore, we not only
pay off the debts of youth, but we build up a positive balance with
society which we then draw upon in age. This rather idyllic picture is
not, of course, always observed in practice. For society as a whole, how-
ever, it is not an unplausible description of the relations among the
various age groups. In the end what looks like philanthropy often
turns out to be disguised exchange—exchange, that is, over a period
of years. This still does not prevent these transactions from looking
very much like philanthropy in the short run.
We now come to the very interesting question of the motivation
for genuinely unilateral transfers, that is, a quid for which there is
no quo, not now, in the future, nor in the past. This raises the ques-
tion as to whether there is anything that might be called "rational"
philanthropic behavior. What are the standards, in other words, by
which we can judge whether a man, or a foundation, or even a
government is giving away its money wisely. It is clear that in practice
we do have some standards and it therefore must make some kind of
sense to talk about rational philanthropy. Philanthropic donations,
that is to say, are not wholly random or arbitrary. They are capable
of criticism according to some kind of welfare function even though
the function may be very difficult to specify.
In a formal sense, of course, it is possible to deal with this situation
by the ordinary theory of utility. We suppose that an individual or an
organization has a certain amount of income to dispose of—to divide
among various competing uses of which the philanthropic use is one.
The formal solution to this problem is that the marginal utility of
the "dollar" should be the same in all uses. Otherwise, of course, it
is possible to increase the total utility by transferring dollars from one
use to another. That is, we give to charity up to the point where we
feel that an extra dollar given does not represent to us the same utility
as a dollar devoted to other purposes, such as the purchase of com-
modities or the addition to our net worth. This theory is so formal
that it cannot help being true. Its truth, however, does not guarantee
that it should be interesting, and unless we can specify more about the
nature of the utility function, this theory says very little more than:
we do what we do. We may, however, at any time reexamine our mode
of life and expenditure and decide that we have been putting too
much in one line and not enough in another, and that hence the
marginal utilities of the dollar were not equal—we were doing some-
thing, in other words, which on further examination proved to be
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li-rational. It is this possibility of further examination which saves
utility theory from complete emptiness. Utility theory does call our
attention to the fact of cost and sacrifice and to the real nature of the
problem which is involved in decisions of this sort. It saves us from
notions of absolute requirements which are so congenial to the mili-
tary man and to the engineer. The idea that everything has its price
may expose us to the charge of cynicism but it should at least save us
from the danger of a false absolutism.
Utility theory will mislead us, however, if we conclude from it that
the motivation for philanthropy is no different from that for other
forms of expenditure. There is nothing in this theory which suggests
that all motivations are alike, even though they can be reduced
formally to a single factor which we call utility. In fact, the motivation
which leads to expenditure for philanthropic purposes may be very
different from that which leads us to build up a personal estate or to
purchase consumption goods for our own use. I refer here particularly
to "genuine" donations, that is, gifts for which there is no identifiable
quid pro quo even in the shape of a personal gratification. There is
a real moral difference, I think, between the gift which is given out
of vanity and the desire for self-aggrandizement or the desire to be
merely fashionable, and the gift which is given out of a genuine sense
of community with the object of the donation. It is this sense of com-
munity which is the essence of what I regard as genuine philanthropy.
The name philanthropy, itself, which means of course, the love of
man, is a clue to the essential nature of the genuine article. When we
make a true gift, it is because we identify ourselves with the recipient.
Even pity, which is not always a particularily ennobling virtue and
which easily slips over into vanity and self-congratulation (there but
for the justice of the universe, rather than the grace of God, go I!)—
even pity is the manifestation of self-identification with the pitied.
It is this capacity for empathy—for putting oneself in another's place,
for feeling the joys and the sorrows of another as one's own—which is
the source of the genuine gift. It is because "no man is an island,"
because the very realization of our own identity implies in some sense
that there is a common identity in humanity, that we are willing to
"socialize" our substance and to share with the afflicted. This is
"charity" before the word became corrupted by vanity and fashion.
It can be dealt with quite easily in utility theory by considering the
utility of one person a function not only of his own wealth or his own
income, but a function of the wealth and income of others. This
assumption does not necessarily destroy the theory of exchange (as I
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show later), although, altruism could be carried to the point where
the utility functions of two exchangers are identical over the field
of possible distribution of commodities between them. In this case the
parties simply move immediately to their mutual optimum in the
field and whether this is done by gift or by exchange really makes
very little difference. This, however, is highly unlikely. We love our
neighbor, but not quite as ourselves. As he gets more and we get
less, we rejoice indeed in his affluence, but at some point our dissatis-
faction with our own penury is likely to exceed this vicarious enjoy-
ment. Once we admit this fact, exchange reestablishes itself.
If we regard the philanthropic donations of an individual as an ex-
pression of his sense of community with others, a great deal that may
seem mysterious orirrational about the phenomenon fallsinto
place. Obviously, the more an individual identifies with some cause,
community, or organization, the more likely he is to support it and
the greater will be his donations to it. This is why the immediate
face-to-face group and the reference groups with which he has identi-
fied himself always figure largely in the amounts given by an individ-
ual. When he gives to his children, for instance, he gives in a sense to
an extension of himself. When he gives to a church of which he is a
member, he is expressing his identity with a community a little larger
than the family but fulfilling some of the same functions. As he con-
tributes toward it, therefore, he is contributing in a sense toward part
of his larger self. The larger the community, however, the harder it
is to finance it by pure donations; the more tenuous the sense of
identity, the less the individual feels that the community is an integral
part of himself. It is a rare nation or State, therefore, that can rely
on the motive of identification, that is, of genuine philanthropy for the
support which it requires from its citizens. We have, therefore, the
phenomenon of taxation which might be regarded as compulsory
philanthropy. Baumol has pointed out that such compulsory philan-
thropy may be quite rational in a situation where an individual will
make a contribution willingly if everybody else makes one, but would
be unwilling if other people did not. Hence, an individual may advo-
cate his own coercion simply because it is accompanied by the coercion
of all the other members of the community. In large, heterogeneous,
and anonymous communities in which the individual loses the sense
of face-to-face contact with the other members, itis almost always
necessary to reinforce philanthropy with coercion and to provide for
unilateral transfers, such as taxes, under some kind of penalty for
failure. Even in private communities, the threat of expulsion can
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be an important factor in inducing the individual to pay what looks
at first sight like a purely voluntary contribution. There may, in other
words, be elements of coercion even in the relationship of the individ-
ual with a purely private organization or community.
Up to now, I have been dealing mainly with the philanthropy of
the individual. I now turn to the problem of the professional philan-
thropist, as exemplified by the foundation. We here run into a prob-
lem and a set of motivations which may be very different from those
of the private individual donor. The foundation is a specialized giver.
The amount which it gives is usually determined by the conditions
under which it has been set up (although there may be some latitude
in this regard). Consequently, its donations are not, like those of the
individual giver, sharply competitive with alternative uses in con-
sumption or in saving. Once the donor has decided to set up the
foundation, the question as to how much it should give is largely
taken out of the realm of decision-making. The problem of the
foundation, therefore, is not so much whether its sense of community
with the object of the gift merits an extra dollar drawn from compet-
ing uses, but rather, whether the money should go to one deserving
object or another. The main problem of the foundation, in other
words, is that of the choice among possible recipients of its bounty.
This raises the question whether we could have a theory of the
foundation in the sense in which we have a theory of the firm. It is
obvious that the two institutions differ sharply. The theory of profit
maximization, while it is subject to many exceptions and qualifications,
is at least a reasonable first approximation to the theory of the firm.
We seem to have no such first approximation in the theory of the
foundation. Nevertheless, a foundation must make choices much as a
firm does. It has to decide that A is worthy and B is not. It must
develop a policy according to which it makes and, perhaps even more
important, justifies its decisions. Even though its purpose is to do
good rather than to make profits and even though profits have a cer-
tain objectivity of measurement which the good has not, nevertheless,
it is presumably in the interest of a foundation to do more good in
its own estimation rather than less. The notion of the maximization
of good, although it may not lead to a clear mathematical and ob-
jective rule of action, is at least a theoretical beginning.
A foundation faces one problem (which may also be present in the
firm) in what may be an acute degree. A firm may find that it makes
much the same amount of profit over a large area of its field of pos-
sible choice—in this case its actual decisions are, in a strict economic
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sense, indeterminate. Likewise, a foundation may come to feel that it
will do about the same amount of good in widely differing areas
and for widely differing distributions of its largesse among various
objects. Under these circumstances, the problem of "maximizing be-
havior" is a very difficult one because the maximizing principle gives
us no clear rule for action. It is not surprising, therefore, if organiza-
tions develop rules of thumb or what might be called rules of exclu-
sion. A wide and open field gives us agoraphobia. We therefore build
fences across it and around it. We say we will not do A, we will not
do B, we will not do C and by the time we have excluded these possi-
bilities by rule, there may be only one alternative left to us, D, which
we then select. One can see this happening constantly in the founda-
tions—one of the first decisions that a board of directors of a founda-
tion makes is what it will not do. It partitions the general field and
almost always decides to limit itself to a small area.
The process of decision-making by successive eliminationis,of
course, not confined to foundations. Every individual, organization,
or society, when absolute rationality, that is, "maximizing" behavior
is despaired of, retreats into taboo, ritual and rule of thumb. There
is, perhaps, more excuse for this kind of behavior in the foundation
than there is in many other forms of organization. Even in the foun-
dation, however, it frequently represents a retreat from responsibility.
An organization which follows this principle also is in grave danger
of finding its principles obsolete. The world is apt to change more
rapidly than our rules about it. A foundation which decided, for in-
stance, to support only a particular area of medical research might
find itself left high and dry when this particular area encounters suc-
cess.
Even though it is very difficult to specify the exact form of the wel-
fare function of a foundation, there is a certain analog of the market
in the mutual competition of foundations for grantees and of poten-
tial grantees for foundation support. There is even a certain analogy
between the "states of the market" as we develop this in the theory
of monopoly and imperfect competition and the various possible states
of the relations between foundations and their grantees. We can visual-
ize the situation, for instance, of extreme monopoly of the granting
power. The totalitarian socialist state would be such a monopoly. Here
the success of a potential grantee depends upon his ability to present
his case before the right persons and the right channels within the
monolithic organization of the granting power. By contrast, suppose
a situation analogous to perfect competition in which there are a
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large number of foundations and a large number of grantees. Here
there is a possibility of shopping around. An applicant who is un-
successful with one foundation may turn to another and vice versa.
There is in fact some competition among the foundations for desirable
applicants, but ordinarily we may assume that the amount which
applicants are seeking is very much in excess of what the foundations
are able and willing to grant. Hence, the rationing function has to
be performed by the foundation rather than by the applicant.
It would be very interesting if we could develop theorems relating
the state of the granting market in regard to monopoly or competition
to the desirability of the results and if we could, for instance, make
a case against monopoly of the granting power, as we can make a
case against monopoly in exchange relationships. I have an intuitive
feeling that some such proposition is plausible. I would not be so
presumptuous, however, as to attempt to demonstrate it. We need in
the first place, some measure of the success of the granting program.
What is it, in other words, that would make one distribution of grants
among the potential applicants better or worse than another such dis-
tribution? Strong cases can easily be cited. The Ford Foundation,
for instance, is rarely blamed even by its most vociferous critics for
rejecting a proposal to plant a 3,000-mile-long rose garden along the
frontier of the United States and Canada as a symbol, or perhaps as
a memorial, to the peaceful relations established along this border.
Once we leave the patently absurd, however, there seems to be room
for strong differences of opinion as to the wise course to follow in
the making of grants. The rejected suitors naturally feel hurt and in-
dignant. Foundations may tend to minimize this hurt by giving every-
body a little. This seems, indeed, to have been the principle of The
Ford Foundation. It is subject to the criticism that it results in a large
number of weak proposals and weak institutions instead of a few
strong ones. It is arguable, for instance, that Rockefeller did more for
American education, even for the salaries of professors, by establishing
a single strong University of Chicago than The Ford Foundation has
done by broadcasting its largesse.
The problem of the ideal structure of foundation grants is com-
plicated by the fact that the effects of these grants are often not what
either the donor or the recipient intend. This is mainly owing to the
varying elasticities in the supply of labor, especially intellectual labor.
When a grant is given for a certain purpose, the assumption is that
there exists a market within which the accomplishment of this pur-
pose can be bought. If in fact, a supply of whatever it is that embodies
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the purpose is highly inelastic, the main result of the grant will be to
bid up the price of this supply rather than to increase its quantity.
In the long run, of course, if the grant is repeated and continuous,
supplies tend to be more elastic. Most foundation grants, however,
do not operate in the long run. Thus, if a number of foundations
start giving grants for, shall we say, studies in Chinese, the main re-
suit is to bid up the price of Chinese specialists, sometimes to the
point where the traditional structure of incomes is seriously disturbed,
and yet there is not much increase in the total body of Chinese studies
produced. The competing programs spend most of their time, energy,
and money in bidding the specialists away from each other.
Just as we used what might be called the principle of reexamination
to rescue the theory of utility from total formalism, so we might in-
voke the same principle in the theory of grants. A foundation may
certainly regret having made a grant and an applicant may even re-
gret having received it; there may be afterthoughts and reexamina-
tions. One of the institutional problems, therefore, is the learning
process by which the foundations and other granting agencies learn
from their mistakes. One difficulty here in attempting to use the
analogy of competition is that in a market situation, especially in
perfect competition, a firm which makes serious mistakes will go Out
of existence. The only fatal mistakes which a foundation can make,
however, are in its investment policy, not in its granting policy. As
far as I can see, there is nothing in social ecology which would lead
to the elimination of a foundation which indulged in the uttermost
folly in its grant-making, provided that its investment policy was
sound. Foolish or irresponsible grant-making might, of course, in the
long run stir up enough social resentment to lead to the disestablish-
ment of the foundations. The dissolution of the monasteries stands
•as a solemn historical warning. The presence of immortals is always
an embarrassment to a mortal society, and it is certainly easy to imag-
ine that the foundations might become such large and significant cen-
ters of private power that the state will be forced to disestablish them.
This follows from the position of the foundation as an element in the
polity rather than in the economy. The prospect of disestablishment
in the future, however, islittle safeguard against mistakes in the
present.
By way of conclusion, if the case for competition among founda-
tions is a strong one, one wonders whether there is not also a case for
something like an antitrust law for foundations. The very large foun-
dations do represent a source of political and economic power, which
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however wisely exercised,ispolitically irresponsible;thatis,not
responsible to anybody beyond a self-perpetuating body of trustees.
A situation like this in a society always contains the seeds of potential
danger. A law which would compel the split of any foundation ex-
ceeding perhaps $100,000,000 would at least distribute this power
more widely, would lessen the possibility of really disastrous mistakes,
and would give the applicant a better chance to shop around. Even
a superficial knowledge of the activities of foundations suggests that
it is the small ones which are frequently the most creative and imag-
inative. The larger a foundation gets, the more it begins to look like
an arm of government and the less justification there seems to be,
therefore, for the private exercise of this power.
Appendix. Altruism and Utility
The theory of exchange or bilateral monopoly, as developed in the
first instance by Edgeworth, can easily be adapted to any degree of
altruism that we wish. In the usual exposition, we indicate the dis-
tribution of two commodities between two exchangers by the position
of a point P inside the box being the point where ex-
changer A has none of either commodity, and °bthepoint where
exchanger B has no commodity. OaX is the total amount of commodity
X and OaY is the total amount of commodity Y to be divided between
the two exchangers. Thus at the point P, exchanger A has of
commodity X and of commodity Y; exchanger B has ofcom-
modity Y and PXb of commodity X. In pure exchange, of course, there
is no change in the total quantity of the two commodities. Exchange
is merely a rearrangement of assets.
In the usual analysis, we suppose that each party to the exchange
has a utility function represented by indifference curves—the solid
curved lines being those for A, the broken lines being those for B
(see Figure 1). We suppose that A's utility increases the more he has
of anything and the less B has, and B's utility increases the more he
has and the less A has. This is the usual nonaltruistic case. If we
visualize the utility functions in the third dimension above the plane
of the paper, A's utility function is a mountain which rises continu-
ously as we go away from °a in any direction. B's utility function is
a mountain which rises likewise as we go away from °binany direc-
tion. The heavy dotted line C1C2C3 is the contract curve or the locus
of the points of tangency of the two systems of indifference curves.
It is easy to show that from any point in the figure not on the con-





tract curve, itis possible to reach points on the contract curve by
some process of exchange which will make both parties better off.
In the ordinary case, A's utility depends only on the amounts of
commodity which he possesses, and similarly for B. There is no reason,
however, why we should not extend the analysis to include the case
in which A's utility depends not oniy on what he has, but also on
what B has. In this case, we might suppose that A's total utility con-
sists of two parts—the part which is derived from his own possession
of the two commodities and the part which is derived from his con-
templation of B's possession of them, that is, from altruism. Thus,
suppose we take a section of the three-dimensional utility surfaces
along the line YaXb (see Figure 2), where utility is measured in the
vertical direction. 'We may suppose that YaUa represents the direct util-
ity to A of the increase in commodity X. The curve XbUb represents
the indirect utility to A as he contemplates B increasing the amount
of commodity X which B possesses. The sum of these two utility curves
is the curve UbUmU0. We are assuming here, of course, all sorts of
shocking things about the measurability and comparability of utilities,
but this may be unavoidable.
In Figure 3, we return to the axes of Figure 1 and draw the indiffer-
ence curves of the two parties which would correspond to theutility
functions of Figure 2. The solid lines, as before, represent the indiffer-
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ence curves of party A and the dotted lines of party B. It will be ob-
served that the corresponding utility functions now exhibit a maxi-
mum at Ma and Mb respectively. This means that as we move from
toward °b' A's utility actually declines, in spite of the fact that
he is gaining more goods, because the direct gain to himself is out-
weighed by the pity which he feels at B's miserable poverty. Similarly,
B's utility declines as we move from Mb toward °a
Consider now, the line HaMaKa which is drawn through all the
points where A's indifference curves are vertical, and the correspond-
ing line LaMaNa which is drawn through all the points where A's
indifference curves are horizontal. These lines, intersecting at Ma,
divide the field into four regions. In the region OGHOMaLa, A's indif-
ference curves are the same as in Figure 1, that is to say, he is selfish
in both commodities. In the region MGNUOaKa, he is altruistic in both
commodities. It is impossible, formally, to distinguish this case from
the case where the commodities have become discommodities, but in
our case, we suppose they have become discommodities to A because
of his altruism. He cannot bear to have more of them at B's expense.
In the region LaMaKaX, he is selfish in regard to commodity Y and
altruistic in regard to commodity X. This situation is exactly reversed
in the area HUMaNaY. Similar lines, HhMbKb and LbMbNb, can be
drawn through Mb and a similar analysis performed for the party B.
These two sets of lines divide the field into nine regions. To avoid
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in Figure 4. In the central region, 5, both parties are selfish in both
commodities. The situation is essentially the same as in Figure 1. The
contract curve joins Mb to Ma and the analysis of exchange follows
exactly as it does in Figure 1. In region 7, A is selfish and B is altruistic
in both commodities. Exchange is impossible from any point within
the region. B will simply give A both commodities until the point Mb
is reached. This is, therefore, a region of two-commodity philanthropy
for B. Similarly, the region labeled 3 is a region of two-commodity
philanthropy for A, and from any point in this region, we proceed
immediately to Ma.Regions2, 4, 6, and 8 are characterized by the
fact that each party is altruistic in one commodity and selfish in an-
other, and that the commodity in which one party is altruistic will be
that in which the other party is selfish. In region 1, both parties are
altruistic in X and selfish in Y; in region 9, both parties are altruistic
in Y and selfish in X.
We see in this figure that both exchange and philanthropy are spe-
cial cases of movement within the field of the figure. Exchange is a
movement in any direction on a line with a negative but not infinite
slope, such as for instance, PE in Figure 1. Here each party gives up
one commodity to the other and receives the other commodity in
return. A horizontal movement is a pure gift of commodity X, thus a
movement from P toward Xb in Figure 1is a gift of commodity X
from A to B. A movement from P to a gift of commodity X
from B to A. Similarly a vertical move in either direction is a gift of
commodity Y. A move along a line with a positive slope, such as PF
in Figure 1, represents a gift of both commodities. If we define a "trad-
ing move" as a move which makes both parties better off than they
were before, we see that, in region 5, only exchanges can be trading
moves. In regions1 and 9, both exchanges and gifts of both com-
modities by either party in certain proportions can be trading moves.
In regions 7 and 3, exchanges cannot be trading moves. In regions 2,
4, 6 and 8, exchange may be a trading move, and gifts of the two com-
modities in certain proportions by only one of the parties may also
be trading moves.
In the case of total altruism, where each party regards the interest
of the other as identical with his own, the points MaandMb move
together until they coincide. When this happens, regions 2, 4, 5, 6 and
8 disappear. Both parties will move towards a single optimum,
either by exchange in regions 1 and 9 or by gifts of both commodities
in regions 3 and 7. It is interesting to note that even in this extreme
case, exchange is not wholly ruled out; but, of course, the contract
curve shrinks to a single point and there is no conflict.
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